



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3D MARINE REGIMENT
3D MARINE DIVISION, FMF
BOX 63004
MCB HANFORD, BAY HI 96863-3004

IN REPLY TO 110
5830
IO
7 May 21

From: (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

To: Commanding Officer, 3d Marine Regiment

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES AND CONDUCT COMPLAINT
DATED 22 MAR 21

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN)
(b) JAGMAN Investigations Handbook, 2016
(c) MCO 5354.1F (PAC Order)
(d) MCO 5800.14 (Victim and Witness Assistance Program)

Encl: (1) Appointment Letter
(2) Statement from (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
(3) Document submitted by (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) entitled "Encounter Compilation"
(4) Statement from (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
(5) Statement from (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
(6) Statement from (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
(7) Statement from (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
(8) Counseling statements for (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
(9) Statement from (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
(10) (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) PAC Complaint

Preliminary Statement

1. This reports completion of the command investigation in accordance with the references into the facts and circumstances surrounding the prohibited activities and conduct complaint dated 22 Mar 21. I collected all reasonably available relevant evidence and met all command directives.
2. I encountered two difficulties during the investigation. First, some witnesses struggled to remember critical events or important timelines due to the time lapse between the reported events and this investigation. Second, the complaint subject, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) Executive Officer, Headquarters Company, 3d Marines, exercised his right to remain silent and declined to make a statement.
3. To assist with determining whether the actions described in this investigation constituted substantiated PAC violations, I relied on the following key definitions from Reference (c):
 - a. Bullying is a form of harassment that includes knowing, reckless, or intentional conduct that includes acts of aggression by a Service member, with a nexus to military service, with the

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
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intent of harming a Service member or DOD civilian employee either physically or psychologically, without a proper military or other governmental purpose. In general, the evidence should show that the acts of aggression displayed by the subject were done for the purpose of exclusion, e.g., intimidating or rejecting the recipient from acceptance into the group or unit because he or she is considered different or weak. If the inquiry or investigation fails to establish intent, the event should not be considered bullying.

b. Harassment (of which bullying, by definition, is a form), is any conduct, whereby a Service member knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally and with a nexus to military service engages in behavior that is unwelcome or offensive to a reasonable person that creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment. Behavior that is rude, ignorant, abrasive, or unkind, but does not adversely affect the work environment as described in Chapter 1, paragraph 4, is not harassment.

Findings of Fact

1. From March to October 2020, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) served together on 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment (V33) staff. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was the Assistant Operations Officer and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was the Logistics Chief. [Encl (2) and (3)]
2. Their first negative interaction occurred in July 2020 at exercise Bougainville II (BVII), when 3d Battalion experienced multiple logistics failures related to movement, water, and ammunition distribution. [Encls (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (8)]
3. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and S-4 personnel counseled (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) on multiple occasions because his poor management contributed to those logistics failures. [Encl (2), (3), (4), (8), and (9)]
4. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) said (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was "quite blunt" when he criticized him and the S-4 section. Specifically, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) referred to (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) as "a terrible log chief" and the S-4 section as "worthless." [Encl (2)]
5. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was commonly blunt, aggressive, or abrasive in his dealings with the battalion staff. He was not worried about hurt feelings and often pointedly questioned or yelled at battalion personnel in public to correct what he considered poor performance. [Encls (2), (4), (5), (6), and (9)]
6. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) established a pattern of poor performance at BVII, including an inability to manage logistics boards, properly act on orders, keep good notes, or keep a watch manned in the Administration and Logistics Operations Center (ALOC). (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) believed (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) often submitted inaccurate reports and poor plans. [Encl (3)]
7. The next significant negative interaction between (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) happened during Integrated Training Exercise 1-21 (ITX) from September to October 2020,

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES AND CONDUCT COMPLAINT
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when 3d Battalion again experienced multiple logistics failures related to movement, water, and ammunition distribution. [Encl (2), (3), (4), (5), and (8)]

8. Similar to BVII, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) again saw (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) as a major contributor to the logistics failures. Subsequently, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) began consistently questioning and criticizing (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) in public about issues related to logistics planning and execution, sometimes yelling at him in front of his Marines, which created a tense relationship between the S-4 and S-3 sections. [Encl (2), (4), (5), and (6)]

9. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) said the S-4 Officer-in-Charge (OIC), (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was often absent from daily operations during ITX leaving (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) with tasking authority over the S-4. [Encl (2) and (4)]

10. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) consistently performed at a subpar level and struggled to conduct effective logistical planning and coordination, maintain accountability and timelines, keep logistics boards updated, or effectively sustain subordinate units. [Encl (3)]

11. Many staff members attributed the multiple logistics mistakes to (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) during both BVII and ITX. [Encl (4), (5), and (9)]

12. The most confrontational encounter between (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) occurred on 15 Oct 21. [Encl (2), (3), (4), (5), and (7)]

13. On 15 October in the morning, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) met with the motor transport chief and the communications chief. While they were talking, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) interrupted and told (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) he was "notoriously too loud," and needed to leave because he did not belong in the Combat Operations Center (COC). [Encl (2) and (7)]

14. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) started to feel targeted after this third confrontation with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) [Encl (2)]

15. Later that evening, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) joined a phone conversation with the Regimental Mobility Officer, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) the battalion embarkation officer, regarding retrograde planning. During the meeting, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) walked over to listen in, and after (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) asked to get back to the mobility officer regarding a shipping question about sniper rifles, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) began yelling at him in the COC, in front of everyone. [Encl (2), (3), (4), (5), and (7)]

16. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) asked, "What, are you worthless? Answer the question!" He then said, "I'm tired of you, you don't belong in this job." Finally, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) told (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to get out of the COC because he "doesn't belong" and not to come back. [Encl (2) and (4)]

17. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) interrupted the conversation because he thought (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was derailing the conversation from its intended purpose and arguing with the mobility officer

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES AND CONDUCT COMPLAINT
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instead of doing what she directed. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) directed (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to leave the COC because his inability to listen actively detracted from work being done and he was not a valuable contributor. [Encl (3)]

18. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) left the COC to finish the phone call but returned when completed to retrieve his serialized gear. When he returned, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) moved to block his path and again told him to leave the COC because he didn't belong there, and he had already been ordered to leave. [Encl (2), (3), (4), and (5)]

19. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) yelled at him repeatedly, saying "I told you to get out, I don't want to see you again, you don't belong in this battalion, get out!" [Encl (2)]

20. Other people in the COC report that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) kept yelling at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) but due to the amount of time since these events, they only recall specifically his direction to get out and his assertion that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) didn't belong there. [Encl (4), (5), and (7)]

21. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) took these statements as a personal attack and felt (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) bullied him. [Encl (2)]

22. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) considered his order for (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to leave the COC a lawful one because the commander mandated that the COC and associated spaces were for work and that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did not produce meaningful work in the COC. [Encl (3)]

23. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) physically blocked (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) from moving further, leaving them face to face, which resulted in a sort of "chest-bumping" match. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) continued to yell at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) [Encl (2), (3), (4), and (5)]

24. At one point, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) lightly pushed (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) in the chest with one hand while yelling into his face. [Encl (2)]

25. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) then pushed between both personnel to defuse the situation, directing (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to get his serialized gear, while indicating to (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) that the (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) would then leave as directed. [Encl (2), (3), (4), and (5)]

26. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) watched (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) collect his serialized gear. On his way out of the COC, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) made a comment about (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) unprofessional conduct. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did not respond. [Encl (2), (3), and (4)]

27. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did not return to the COC until a couple days later. He and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did not speak to one another after this incident.

28. On 18 October, three days after the incident, the V33 Executive Officer, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) relieved (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) from his position as the logistics chief and sent him home. Soon after ITX, the logistics officer, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was also relieved. [Encl (2, 4, 5)]

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Opinion

1. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)s conduct, while unprofessional, did not constitute a PACO violation under the definitions. Instead, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)s actions were an unprofessional reaction to a poor performer. [FF (3), (5), (6), (10), (11), (16), (19), (20), (23), and (24)]

Recommendation

1. I recommend (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) receive a non-punitive letter of caution for unprofessional conduct and poor judgment in his interactions with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

3D MARINE REGIMENT
3D MARINE DIVISION, FMF
BOX 63004
MCBH KANEOHE BAY HI 96863 3004

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5800
CO
15 Apr 21

From: Commanding Officer, 3d Marine Regiment

To: (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) /0202 USMC

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES AND CONDUCT COMPLAINT DATED 22 MAR 21

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN, 2019)
(b) JAGMAN Investigations Handbook, 2016
(c) MCO 5354.1E W/ADMIN CH (PAC Order)
(d) MCO 5800.14 (Victim and Witness Assistance Program)

1. This appoints you, per reference (a), as the investigating officer to conduct a detailed investigation in accordance with the reference, under the authority of the Commanding Officer, 3d Marines.

2. Investigate into the facts and circumstances surrounding the Prohibited Activities and Conduct complaint (case number 002021000240) made on 22 March 2021 against (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) /0302 USMC, Executive Officer, Headquarters Company, 3d Marines. Specifically, into the allegations of bullying against (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) /0431 USMC between June and November of 2020.

3. In accordance with reference (d), provide DD Form 2701 to victims and witnesses of suspected crimes. Annotate any DD Form 2701s provided in your preliminary statement for tracking by the Victim and Witness Assistance Coordinator (VWAC).

4. If photographs or video recordings are included as part of your investigation, the following information should be included on the reverse side of the photograph, or label of the video recording: The hour and date taken; a brief description of the location or area photographed or recorded; the full name and rank of the photographer or videographer; the full names (along with ranks, if applicable) and addresses of persons present when the photographs or videos were taken.

5. This investigation is your primary duty, superseding all others. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in letter form no later than 15 May 2021, unless an extension of time is granted. If you have not previously done so, read chapter II of reference (a) before beginning your investigation. A guiding checklist can be found in reference (b), chapter III.

6. You are directed to seek legal advice from the (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, 3d Marine Division at DSN 622 9039 or (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) during the course of your investigation. Send a copy of your report to the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate for review prior to submitting it to the command.

7. The point of contact for this matter is (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) at 808-257-1916 or via email at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6).

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

By direction

Encl (1)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3D MARINE REGIMENT
3D MARINE DIVISION, FMF
BOX 63004
MCBH KANEOHE BAY HI 96863-3004

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5800

IO

19 May 21

From: (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) /0202 USMC
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
Via: Commanding Officer, 3d Marine Regiment

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION FOR INVESTIGATION TIMELINE IN THE CASE OF DASH CASE
NUMBER 002021000240

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7G
(b) MCO 5354.1E

1. In accordance with the references, I respectfully request an extension of the deadline to complete the command investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged bullying of (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

/0431 USMC by (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) /0302 USMC.

2. The investigation was originally delayed due to the Regiment having difficulty finding an available officer to conduct it, since the rank and billet of the accused gave the case a higher degree of sensitivity. Additionally, after consultation with the Staff Judge Advocate's office, I believe additional investigative steps are required before I am able to fully provide the findings of fact, as well as my opinions and recommendations. If approved, the new deadline for this investigation will be 24 May 2021.

3. The point of contact for this matter is (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) at 808-257-5172 or via email at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6).

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

Encl (1)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
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3D MARINE DIVISION, FMF
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IN REPLY REFER TO:
5800
CO
20 May 21

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)' ltr 5800 IO on 19 May 21

From: Commanding Officer, 3d Marine Regiment
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION FOR INVESTIGATION TIMELINE IN THE CASE OF DASH CASE
NUMBER 002021000240

1. I have reviewed the request and am forwarding, recommending approval.
2. The point of contact for this matter is (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) at 808-257-1916 or via email at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6).

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3D MARINE DIVISION, FMF
III MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
UNIT 35801
FPO AP 96382 5801

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5800
SJA
21 May 21

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
To: (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) /0202 USMC

Subj: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION FOR INVESTIGATION TIMELINE IN CASE OF
DASH CASE NUMBER 002021000240

1. Returned, approved for extension to the subject command investigation. The new deadline for completion is 24 May 2021.
2. The point of contact for this matter is the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 3d Marine Division, DSN (315) 622-7681.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:
CO, 3d Mar
SJA
EOA

Encl (1)

20 April 2021

Interview with [REDACTED] (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) Regimental SACO, Previous 3/3 Logistics Chief, Complainant

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) first started dealing with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) in April of 2020, when he became the S-3A of V33. At that time, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) seemed like an outspoken officer with lots of interesting ideas for the S4 and how to make it work well. Things began to sour during Exercise Bougainville II at PTA in July 2020, when there were multiple issues with logistics that created significant tension within the Battalion staff. In one instance, there was an ammunition distribution problem with one of the companies that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) believed was the S4's failure. He entered the ALOC and yelled at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) in front of his Marines, telling him "you guys are worthless, get your shit together" and directed him to fix the issue, which (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) eventually did. Because he used his personal cell phone to do so, which was against the Battalion Commander's direction, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) also corrected him on that decision, which (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) tried to take as constructive criticism at the time. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) said the S-4 Marines had very negative feelings about (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) from then on. There was another event in which a company had run out of water, and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) tried to be open about that with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), who then told him he was a "terrible Log Chief," and told him to find a solution.

They did not have much interaction between BVII and ITX, but at ITX, they had more conflict. At ITX, there were a number of significant logistics issues that did not paint the S4 in a good light. It appeared to (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) that his S4 OIC, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), had more or less been "soft-relieved," as he did not seem to be making many decisions or involved in many events or meetings, and in the vacuum, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was tasking and running the S4. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), at one point, did support this state of events to a degree by stating that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was the S-3A, so he had tasking authority. So the S4 felt they were being told to do what (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) said, even if it was against Marine Corps order.

After multiple conflicts between the S4 and S3 over logistics challenges during the exercise, they had their most confrontational encounter on October 15, 2020. That morning, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) interrupted a meeting between (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and two other chiefs, accused him of being too loud in the COC and told him "he didn't belong there," and that he should get out or something bad would happen. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) asserted that he did belong there because he was the Logistics Chief and this was his place of duty. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did not push the issue further. It was at this moment that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) began to feel like he was being bullied and targeted.

Later on that afternoon, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) joined a phone meeting on retrograde planning with the Regimental Mobility Officer and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) came over and stood over him and listened in, and after (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) asked to get back to the Mobility Officer regarding a shipping question about sniper rifles, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) began yelling at him in the public forum of the COC, with multiple junior and peer Marines present, saying, "what, are you worthless? Answer the question!" and "I'm tired of you, you're a piece of shit, you don't belong in this job" and telling him to get out of the COC because he "doesn't belong." (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) also told him not to come back into the COC.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

Encl (2)

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) left with the phone and finished his conversation with the Mobility Officer. When he attempted to re-enter the COC to grab his serialized gear, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) immediately began yelling at him, telling him "I told you to get out, you don't belong in here, I don't want to see you again, you don't belong in this battalion, you don't belong in the S4, get out!" (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was upset by this treatment, but tried to ignore it, and grab his gear without saying anything. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) then blocked his path and continued to yell at him. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) told the captain that he was going to get his gear, at which point (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) stepped close and lightly pushed him with one open hand. It was difficult to see because they were so close, but (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was angry after this push and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) noticed, so he pushed in between (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to create space and try to defuse the situation. He told (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to get his gear, which the (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did, all while (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was staring and waiting for (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to leave. At this point, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did make a comment suggesting that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) behavior was "unbecoming of an officer." (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did not respond, but continued staring at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) until the (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) left.

This event occurred on a Saturday and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did not return to the COC until Monday, after his OIC said he could return. He was relieved as Logistics Chief that Monday evening and sent home the next day.

After (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was fired, he and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did not talk to each other unless it was absolutely necessary because duties demanded it. During the month of March, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was placed on duty three times, including twice in one week. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) is in charge of the duty roster.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was often "rough and abrasive" when he corrected people on the Battalion staff, but (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) felt (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) treatment of him rose to level of bullying because of how the Captain singled him out, which he did at the chief's meeting on 15 Oct, and how he made his attacks personal, saying "you don't belong here," and implying that the (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was worthless.

Other members of the staff also corrected the S4 and expressed frustration with their mistakes, including the Headquarters and Services Company Commander, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). But (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) had a constructive approach to correction, and didn't resort to the disparagement (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS

Name: (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) Rank/Rate: (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

Service: USMC Unit: HQ Co, 30 Reg

Telephone number: 406 - 446 - 7068

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense(s) of: Article 92 (PAC Violation) and that:

- ☒ I have the right to remain silent.
☒ Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
☒ I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
☒ I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
☒ I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

☐ I further certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

- ☐ I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent.
☐ I expressly desire to make a statement.
☐ I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to questioning.
☐ I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
☐ This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

(Member signature/date)

20210506

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

(Witness signature/date)

20210506

Encounter Compilation

General

Overall, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) displays the following qualities: an inability to follow orders, an inability to meet or come close to timelines, subpar to nonexistent logistical planning capabilities, subpar to nonexistent supervisory abilities, poor attention to detail, extreme difficulty in focusing on a task, subpar to nonexistent problem solving abilities, and disrespect to senior SNCOs, warrant officers, and commissioned officers.

From March 2020 through October 2020, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) repeatedly demonstrated an inability to come to Operations and Logistics sync meetings prepared. Meetings often created little value, as nearly all logistics function questions and requests were met with a version of "I have to check on that, I'll get back to you." This differed significantly when any other member of the S-4 attended these meetings, as they had detailed knowledge on the status of vehicle, ammo, and other logistical requests from the companies. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) actively created friction in these meetings by relaying incorrect information that needed to be later recalled after the fact. One specific example was the outdated requirement of creating meal card rosters.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was ordered to attend the Watch Officer and Watch Chief course from 8 September to 11 September. During the week of 1 September, the Assistant Operations Officer instructed the Assistant Logistics Officer to ensure that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) understood the time and location he was required to be at on 8 September. On the morning of 8 September, the Assistant Operations Officer contacted (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) at or around 0700 to ensure that he was awake and would arrive on time. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) responded in the affirmative and confirmed that he would be on time to the course. The Assistant Operations Officer arrived at the muster location (the Battle Sim Center) at 0745 to verify accountability. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was not present. The Assistant Operations Officer contacted (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) via cell phone. The call connected around 0755. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) told the Assistant Operations Officer that he was running late but would be there within 10 minutes. At 0820, the Assistant Operations Officer witnessed (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) pull in to the Battle Sim Center parking lot. The Assistant Operations Officer inquired to as why (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was late, to which he received no meaningful reply. While escorting (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to the classroom, the Assistant Operations Officer ordered him to arrive early enough the next day so that he would be on time. The Assistant Operations Officer drafted a negative counseling for (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). On 9 September, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was late to the class again. The Assistant Operations Officer drafted another negative counseling. The Logistics Officer told the Assistant Operations Officer that he would deliver the negative counselings. The Assistant Operations Officer agreed to this.

Exercise Bougainville II/DTP 3

During Exercise Bougainville II, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) served as the Logistics Chief within the Combat Operations Center. During the exercise, the Current Operations Officer repeatedly interacted with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) with regards to the basic functionality of the ALOC. Specific issues included: extreme inability to keep the logistics boards updated, inability to estimate unit consumption rates, inability to take action on orders, inability to take notes when receiving directives after repeated instruction to take notes, inability to keep a watch manned in the ALOC.

During the unit marshalling for movement for Exercise Bougainville II (on or about 13 July 2020), the third main body movement mustered as per the timeline. After weapons and EDL were drawn and fully accounted for, the next action was to ride buses to the airfield. The buses missed their planned arrival

time. The Assistant Operations Officer left the marshalling area to search for a member of the S-4 to determine where the buses were and why they were late. When he found one of the clerks, that clerk informed him that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was coordinating the movements. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was unable to be contacted. Two hours after the scheduled arrival time the buses arrived. The issue had been that the assistant drivers for the buses had not been informed that they needed to remain with the buses for subsequent movements and had left. Ultimately, it was Co K that provided the assistant drivers to the buses to move the personnel to the airfield in time to meet their flight.

To specific examples, in the latter half of the exercise, the Current Operations Officer tasked the ALOC to build movement timelines for companies and their associated training events. The Log Chief came on to the Watch Floor to brief the watches on the timelines. During his brief, he referred to a movement timeline for Co K. The Current Operations Officer checked his references and noted that the timeline briefed was for Co I. When the Current Operations Officer inquired with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to if he meant Co I, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) responded with that he had said Co I. When pressed, he stood by his assertion. The Current Operations Officer responded that he had not stated the correct company and that the Log Chief had to be deliberate and accurate when pushing timelines to the Watch Floor. Adjacent watch standers on the floor confirmed that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) had said Co K. The Current Operations Officer pulled (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) aside outside of the COC for further discussion, as inaccurate reports and poor plans were a trend from the Log Chief. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) acknowledged this and thanked the Current Operations Officer for holding him accountable while still providing him both the tools and the individual effort to help him fix the issues.

During this exercise, Hurricane Douglas forced training to cease briefly, creating a large, unexpected amount of ammunition. Pending more information from the S-4A on the ammo mishandling and associated investigation by 1st Div.

ITX 1-21

During ITX 1-21, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) served as the Logistics Chief within the Combat Operations Center. During the exercise, the Current Operations Officer repeatedly interacted with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) with regards to the basic functionality of the ALOC. Specific issues included: extreme inability to keep the logistics boards updated, inability to estimate unit consumption rates, untrained watch standers, inability to conduct logistical planning, inability to coordinate logistic missions, absent watch standers, inability to coordinate sustainment of units in a timely manner. Additionally, he was repeatedly observed and counseled on spending long stretches of time socializing in a non-work manner within the workspaces while numerous logistical products and plans were overdue.

On one night early in the exercise, the Current Operations Officer was on the watch floor around 0000. The Current Operations Officer inquired to the ALOC who the watch for the S-4 was, to which (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) responded in the affirmative. When questioned further, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) informed the Current Operations Officer that his only instructions for watch were to run and get (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) if something happened. The Current Operations Officer directed (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to execute his duties and retrieve (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). Upon arrival, the Current Operations Officer instructed (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to properly brief and train his watch standers prior to them standing duty by themselves. For training, he instructed (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to have his untrained watch standers to shadow a trained one until they were capable of executing by themselves. The next night, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was on duty, who also informed the Current

Operations Officer that he knew nothing about his duties other than to run and get (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) if anything happened.

For the first week of the exercise, the Current Operations Officer attempted to develop a 96 hour report that detailed the specific plan for each event. Included in these blurbs were detailed timelines for muster, arrival, and departure of units and gear. The Current Operations Officer tasked the S-4 to produce inputs for these reports, to which the responsibility was given to (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). At only one point did (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) provide inputs to these reports between 28 September and 3 October. This one point consisted of (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) using the Current Operations Officer's laptop for over one hour and producing three updates, all to actions from the prior day. The Current Operations Officer ended up developing the relevant timelines himself or on the fly during Operations and Logistics sync meetings. The battalion reached a significant friction point on the night of 3 October related to the management and delivery of ammo. On 4 October, the battalion commander summoned the staff primaries to develop a detailed sync matrix. This remedied the planning issues but cost the staff primaries the preponderance of two days of work.

On 3 October 2020, the Current Operations Officer ran the daily Operations and Logistics sync meeting at 1800. While expressly intended to cover the next 96 hours of operations, each meeting covered (on average) the next 48 hours. The preponderance of the meeting was spent working through logistical planning (both in movement timelines for personnel as well as the transportation and delivery of ammunition, water, food, and fuel). During this meeting, significant time was spent going over the occupation of OP Left and R220, both TTECG events. Eventually, it was decided that the ammo for OP Left would be delivered at 1200, while the ammo for R220 would be delivered at 1700. This was agreed to by all parties. It was identified that Weapons Company had not planned to occupy the range that early (at OP Left), but that they would adjust their timeline to support that delivery time. Following the night Commander's Update Brief at 1900, the staff and companies were reconvened to address confusion in the planning and ammo situation. When the discussion returned to ammo delivery timelines, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) briefed that the ammo would be delivered to the ranges at 1700 (to R220) and 2000 (to OP Left). The Current Operations Officer responded that this was not what was agreed to in the planning session and inquired to why there was a change. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) responded that an issue with the previous ammo plan had been identified and that this new plan fixed the issue. When the Current Operations Officer pressed him on what the problem was, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) said that it was that the company would not be there to receive the ammo at 1200. The Current Operations Officer reminded (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) that this issue had been discussed and resolved in the Ops/Log Sync. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) persisted that the 1700 and 2000 was the timeline to go with using zero justification, all while the battalion commander's guidance remained to not deliver ammo during hours of darkness if at all possible.

Later on during that meeting, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) briefed the detailed convoy timeline to deliver and retrieve the ammo. Up until that point, every convoy to R220 or OP Left from Camp Wilson (and vice versa) was budgeted for 40 minutes of drive time. The Current Operations Officer pulled this timeline from the S-4, specifically from (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), with the timeline verified by others. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) briefed a timeline that had a convoy moving from R220 to Camp Wilson with a movement time of 30 minutes. When questioned by the Current Operations Officer to why there was a difference, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) responded that he didn't know what the Current Operations Officer was talking about. The Operations Officer put forth that maybe (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) had meant the FASP, which is in between the two locations. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) responded in the affirmative, stating that he had, in fact, been referring to a movement between R220 and the FASP. The Current Operations Officer relented the point. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) then briefed the timeline that he was referring to again, once again stating that the movement was from R220 to Camp Wilson (Motor Pool 3). When the Current Operations Officer pressed him immediately on this, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) had no response. The convoy in question had no reason to stop at the FASP as it was carrying neither dunnage nor ammunition.

On 1 October 2020, the Current Operations Officer instructed (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to build the transport plan to and from Camp Wilson for the RSO&I portion of ITX for 3 and 4 October. He emailed him the information containing the 5 W's for events on 3 and 4 October as well as an example of how to build the plan. He then verbally spoke with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) about the contents of the email and the task overall. He inquired with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) if he had any questions. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) responded that he did not. He inquired if (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) would be able to make the stipulated timeline of 1000 on the following day. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) responded in the affirmative. On 2 October 2020, the Current Operations Officer inquired with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) around 1005 to the whereabouts of the transport plan. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) said that he had nearly completed it but hadn't sent it to the Current Operations Officer. The Current Operations Officer instructed him to immediately send him what he had. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) told the Current Operations Officer that he needed to go to the NIPR Café next door and send him what he had within 5 minutes. The Current Operations Officer received the email with attachment from (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) at 1103. The product was incomplete (lacking the detailed breakdown), the timelines did not support personnel arriving at the classes, and it included people that did not have classes as well as not including those who did. Ultimately, his product was not used and the Current Operations Officer created the movement plans for both 3 and 4 October.

From 26 September to 2 October, Headquarters and Service Company had issues rectifying its Equipment Density List, specifically in regards to sections reporting an accurate count of equipment on hand. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was instructed that these sight counts were due at 0530 in front of the Executive Officers hooch and at 1630 at the Armory. On multiple occasions, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) showed up late. On at least one occasion, he failed to account for the Marines in his section and passed up an incorrect sight count. This was confirmed as the H&S Executive Officer had been in the armory moments before finding (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to pull the sight counts from him. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) reported the same numbers that he had in the morning. The H&S Executive Officer had seen one of his Marine's rifles and night vision devices in the armory. The H&S Executive Officer informed him that his counts were wrong and to find him once he actually visually checked all of his Marines' equipment. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) then proceeded to call the Marines in his section, clearly not understanding the purpose of the sight counts. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) has been instructed on the purpose and method of the twice a day sight counts and continues to fail to meet the standard.

On 8 October 2020, the Current Operations Officer arrived at R410A. On that afternoon, the ammo for execution had arrived. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and an element from the S-4 was on site to manage the allotment of ammo as it was for all of the companies in the battalion. The S-4 element had a vehicle. In the course of conversation, the driver of the vehicle (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)) told the Current Operations Officer that rather than call in to Range Control using a radio in the vehicle, he was calling in with a radio at R410A, then calling in his arrival from a radio at Camp Wilson or the FASP. This was due to the fact that the radio in his vehicle did not work. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) interjected that the Marine was lying and the radio did work.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) began to argue. The Current Operations Officer failed by leaving without testing the radio on his own to verify its functionality or lack thereof.

From 8 to 12 October 2020, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) served as the SNCOIC of the Ammo Issue Point at Range 410A. Near the end of the range he was instructed to organize all the remaining ammunition by DODIC and Lot Number. In addition, he was tasked with preparing the 1348's for the turnover of ammunition from (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), as they were busy down range all day. At 0230 when the turnover started, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) had to finish sorting the ammunition by Lot Number and DODIC. In addition, the 1348's for the ammunition that had been dropped off and signed for on the morning of the 11th hadn't been created. This inadequate preparation led to ammunition turnover not being completed until 1630 on the 12th.

From 12 to 14 October, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) served as the SNOIC of the Ammo Issue Point at R400. The Battalion Gunner specifically tasked him to physical separate the ammo allocation for each company, with the company's allocation segregated from the company's allotment by white engineer tape. He also instructed (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to establish a second, adjacent strand of C-Wire that enclosed an area large enough for the company to stage their ammo in once it was drawn. Upon his return later, the Battalion Gunner observed that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) had only marked via writing the ammo by company (it remained in the overall stacks) and had not created the second enclosed area.

During the Logistics Sync Meeting on 15 October 2020 at approximately 1720, the Assistant Operations Officer instructed the Embarkation Officer to personally check in with the Regimental Mobility Officer in regards to the retrograde mobility back to Oahu. The Log Chief did not attend the Log Sync meeting that this tasking was passed at. At or about 1730, the Embark Officer placed a call to the regimental mobility officer. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was now present at the ALOC within the COC. The Current Operations Officer came over to listen in on the conversation. The Embark Officer put the phone on speaker phone. Almost immediately, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) began dominating the conversation. Veering away from the stated purpose of verifying the TMR submissions to get the vehicles and gear from Twentynine Palms to San Diego, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) brought up the SAM flights that carry personnel. He specifically focused on the transportation of sniper rifles in the lower cargo storage areas on the planes. He constantly interrupted the Regimental Mobility Officer while she was speaking and ignored her clear, specific directives on how to handle the situation. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) initially put forth that it was the request that prevented the Snipers from storing their rifles in the lower cargo area. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) stated that was not the case. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) then stated that she had been the one that prevented the storage of the rifles in the lower storage area of the plane. She stated that she did not, that the rifles were authorized to fly in the lower cargo area, but the unit leader had told her that he would bring them in the passenger area by choice. She asked (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) if he knew how many rifles there were. He did not. Going further, she stated that if the rifles were to be stored in the lower cargo area of the plane, all that she needed was a detailed list of how many rifles. She told him that after submitting the gear list to her, she would then forward it to another person. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) began asking if that person was out at Twentynine Palms. The Current Operations Officer interjected at that point, ordering (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to stop derailing the conversation and just listen to what she was telling him to do. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) ignored the Current Operations Officer's direction and kept speaking. The Current Operations Officer repeated his order. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) began shielding the phone and took it off of speaker phone. The Current Operations Officer once again ordered him to listen to her direction, to which (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) responded negatively to the Current Operations Officer. The Current Operations Officer stated that this inability to simply

listen and do rather than go down unproductive paths was why (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) actively detracted from the functioning of ALOC. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) reacted negatively. The Current Operations Officer then ordered SSgt Stradford to leave the COC and not come back, as his presence actively detracted from work being done. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) reacted negatively and followed that up with the comment (with respect to him being kicked out of the COC) "we'll see about that." (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) then continued his phone conversation with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) outside of the COC. Once it was complete, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) reentered the COC. The Current Operations Officer saw him enter and ordered him to leave at once. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) refused. The Current Operations Officer explicitly stated the order was a lawful one as the commander mandated that the COC and associated spaces were for work and that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did not produce meaningful work in the COC. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) reacted negatively and stated that he needed to reclaim his EDL. At this point, the Current Operations Officer had left his desk and was standing by the ALOC, blocking (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) progress. The Current Operations Officer stated that SSgt Stradford should have had his EDL on him in the first place. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) got in the Current Operations Officer chest and face, at a distance of approximately 6 inches. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) said some words and the situation diffused slightly. The Current Operations Officer stood aside and let (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) into the ALOC to retrieve his gear and rifle. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) made several comments while collecting his gear, to include something along the lines of "are you going to stand there and watch me collect my things?" The Current Operations Officer did not respond to (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) words. Once his gear was collected, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) got up to leave. As he was getting up, he said to the Current Operations Officer something along the lines of "some kind of officer you are. What work do you even do?" The Current Operations Officer did not respond. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) then left the building. The Current Operations Officer began detailing notes from the encounter in his written notebook. He finished the notes at 1802, approximately 30 minutes following the encounter. Personnel in the COC during this interaction included but was not limited to (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6).

20 April 2021

Interview with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), Assistant Logistics Officer, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) characterized (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) interactions with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) as "aggressive," and stated that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was "not fond" of (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), generally giving him little room for error. During ITX, the S-4 struggled to consistently perform well, and it was clear that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) believed one of the main issues was incompetence and poor leadership by (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). He often yelled at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), both in private and in front of junior Marines and peers, about problems or mistakes related to logistical support for the battalion. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did often correct people on the battalion staff by yelling at or pointedly questioning them, though it was much more frequent and intense with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6).

During ITX, there was one unusually heated confrontation between (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). During a phone call with the Regimental Mobility Officer, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) began berating (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) over his answer to a specific question, standing over him and repeatedly yelling at him to answer the question. When (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) became overwhelmed he left the COC to continue the conversation with the Regimental Mobility Officer and, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) yelled at him to not come back in the COC. After the phone conversation, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) returned a short time later, and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) immediately moved to block his path, yelling at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to get out, telling him to leave the COC is a lawful order and he had to comply, and that he did not belong in the COC. Because he blocked (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)'s way, the two individuals were right in front of each other, creating a kind of "chest bumping match." At this point, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) pushed in between them in order to try and defuse the situation. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) asserted that he was just getting his serialized gear, and then he would leave. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) stood aside to allow that, but still insisted (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) had to leave the COC because he didn't belong there. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) got his serialized gear, and made a comment about lack of professionalism to (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) as he left the COC. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was relieved of his duties a few days later.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) believed that while (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was often perceived as incompetent, and did make mistakes at times, he was also over tasked. He was a good person with good intentions who became the fall guy of multiple issues within the Battalion.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) also believed that while (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) conduct towards (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was maybe unprofessional, and a little targeted, it was not necessarily bullying, due to the culture of the Marine Corps.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

21 April 2021

Interview with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), Embarkation Officer, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) stated that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was often clearly frustrated with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), and that his frustration would sometimes get the better of him. He would yell at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and question his decision-making in front of the battalion staff, as well as junior Marines. Relations between the S3 and S4 were strained and frustrating for both shops. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) clearly thought that the issues with the S-4 were due to poor management and decision making within the leadership of the S4 shop.

During the main confrontation between (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) in the COC, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was listening in on a conversation between (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and then got frustrated with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) answers. He then started yelling at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to "do his job" and to "answer the question." It was clear that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was tired of being berated by (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), as this was a common between them throughout ITX. When (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) responded out of frustration, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) kicked him out of the COC. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) returned a short time later, and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) yelled at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to get out and was blocking his way from returning to the S4 shop. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) asserted that he was just getting his personal and serialized gear, and then he would leave. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) stood aside to allow this, but still insisted (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) had to leave the COC because he didn't belong there. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was eventually relieved of his duties a few days later for multiple failure regarding to logistical support.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) believed that it was a difficult situation. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) needed a correction due to logistical support and duties as the logistics chief. However, regardless of the failures of (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) does not believe a commissioned officer should've acted in an unprofessional manner as (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) did by making a hard correction on a SNCO in an open forum.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

22 April 2021

Interview with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), Acting Logistics Chief, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) observed during Exercise ITX that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was always listening in on (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) management and directions, and consistently pushed into those conversations to disagree or correct something. At times, it could get very repetitive and reach five or ten times in a day, a pattern of behavior that created lots of tension and made it very difficult for the Marines of S-4 to relax or feel comfortable with a course of action.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) felt he could see how an accusation of bullying made sense, because although (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) often got frustrated with Marines on the staff, he did also direct a lot of anger at (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) specifically, and it was a pretty constant occurrence.

X.C. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

20210420

20210430 Interview with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

Do you feel that there was bullying involved in regard to the incident that occurred between (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6).

I feel this was an isolated major incident that erupted from many smaller minor incidents between these two Marines. I don't feel that there was bullying involved but there was disrespect on both ends that was initially started with the (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). There were many junior Marines within the COC at the time of the incident that did not need to hear or see that breakdown in their chains of command. I do recall that there was several things that were going wrong within the S4 section specifically at ITX 1-21 that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was the chief for and ultimately was blamed for during his time in 3/3.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

COUNSELING WORKSHEET

References: NAVMC 2795 (Guide to Counseling), MCI 8002, MCI 7104, IRAM, MCO P1610.7E (PES)

A. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

Marine Counseled On:							
Last Name	First Name:	MI	EDIPI	Rank	DOR	PMOS	BILMOS
(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	(b) (6)	20170601	0431	0431

Occasion: (Initial, scheduled, event related, etc.)	DATE
NEGATIVE COUNCELING	20200521

Marine Performing Counseling					
Last Name	First Name	MI	EDIPI	Rank	Billet
(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	(b) (6)	ASSISTANT LOGISTICS OFFICER

B. BILLET TITLE (description if required)

BATTALION LOGISTICS CHIEF

C. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED

SNM was contacted via call and text message on 20200522 to confirm his current situation and health in regards to his ROM status after COVID-19 testing. SNM neglected to respond to messages and calls for 36 hours, a direct violation of COVID-19 reporting criteria. SNM has presented limited contact with command since ROM status, and failed to report in to his OIC on a daily basis without prompting.

D. TASKS ASSIGNED FOR NEXT PERIOD

Following the completion of (14) days ROM status, SNM will return to work on 20200526 to attend the Regimental UMCC meeting, and conduct coordination with 3d Regiment and V3/3 UMCC personnel. SNM will keep his cellular device on his person at all times, and be able to be reached within 30 minutes of contact on the part of his OIC. SNM will report into his OIC daily with updates on his location if not at the appointed place of duty at the required time.

E. MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS / ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

SNM has failed to meet the standard expected of a SNCO. Prioritization of health is an acceptable facet to considering courses of action, however the use of consulting medical authorities and receiving care to abuse work place requirements is unacceptable.

F. CERTIFICATION

Signature of Marine Counseled		Do you wish to make a statement?	
		YES	NO
Signature of Marine Performing Counseling		Date:	Proficiency
			N/A
			Conduct
			N/A

COUNSELING WORKSHEET

References: NAVMC 2795 (Guide to Counseling), MCI 8002, MCI 7104, IRAM, MCO P1610.7E (PES)

A. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

Marine Counseled On:							
Last Name	First Name:	MI	EDIPI	Rank	DOR	PMOS	BILMOS
(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	■	(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	■	20170601	0431	0431

Occasion: (Initial, scheduled, event related, etc.)					DATE		
NEGATIVE COUNSELING					20200527		

Marine Performing Counseling							
Last Name	First Name	MI	EDIPI	Rank	Billet		
(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	■	(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	■	ASSISTANT LOGISTICS OFFICER		

B. BILLET TITLE (description if required)

BATTALION LOGISTICS CHIEF

C. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED

During the Battalion ROC walk for DTP II on 7 May SNM displayed a visual lack of understanding related to the Scheme of Maneuver of the field exercise and required speaking points when tasked with a spoken role. Prior to speaking points SNM asked his RO to pull up slides related his points, displaying an unpreparedness for general understanding. SNM's billet demands the all-encompassing understanding, developmental inputs, and vested interest in the finite details of the functions of logistics related to operations, all of these aspects of SNM's billet have been in question. SNM has shown a lack of initiative in the execution of his duties in regards to dedicated training period two, displaying a key lack of capability. SNM's billet is meant to coordinate and join the commodities, create connecting files with HHQ, and facilitate the tactical level equipping of companies and the Battalion as a whole.

D. TASKS ASSIGNED FOR NEXT PERIOD

Following the Battalion 96 period and returning to work on 27 May, SNM will invest himself in the current operations spectrum of the S4's influence. SNM will be present for required meetings, emplace himself at the correct points of friction during the work day, and present himself in a calm collected manner when interacting with both junior Marines and staff members of Battalion.

E. MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS / ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

SNM needs to understand the weight of his billet at the Battalion, and correctly harness and enact the influence associated with his appointed work responsibilities. SNM needs to improve his habits of thought and action to function at the level expected of a SNCO and especially within the position he inhabits.

F. CERTIFICATION

Signature of Marine Counseled		Do you wish to make a statement?	
		YES	NO
Signature of Marine Performing Counseling		Date:	Proficiency
			N/A
			N/A

COUNSELING WORKSHEET

References: NAVMC 2795 (Guide to Counseling), MCI 8002, MCI 7104, IRAM, MCO P1610.7E (PES)

A. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

Marine Counseled On: Last Name	First Name:	MI	EDIPI	Rank	DOR	PMOS	BILMOS
(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	MI	(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	SP7	20170601	0431	0431

Occasion: (Initial, scheduled, event related, etc.)	DATE
Quarterly Counseling	20200630

Marine Performing Counseling Last Name	First Name	MI	EDIPI	Rank	Billet
(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	P	(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)	SP7	ASSISTANT LOGISTICS OFFICER

B. BILLET TITLE (description if required)

BATTALION LOGISTICS CHIEF

C. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED

SNM's quarterly review for third quarter of the year is marked by both positive and negative trends in the work quality and thoroughness presented on a daily basis. SNM during the period showed marked improvement in communication with his direct supervisor (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), reporting back expected metrics of task completion and coordination within the shop. Negative continuing trends are discussed below:

-Work Space Composure: SNM is constantly displaying a stressed demeanor in front of both superior officers, and junior Marines at minor inconveniences. This habit is contagious and leads to decreased efficiency in the work place.

-Task Follow Through: SNM has shown examples of non-completion of tasks. Most recent example centers on the ROM chow delivery process, allowing operational commitments to supersede battle rhythm events, with no coordination completed to make up for manning shortfalls. Other discrepancies include the follow through with regimented pros/cons, training schedule delivery to company office, and missing recurring Monday log Syncs at 3d Regiment.

-Task Delegation: Constant poor planning and time management results in SNM using Marines from the section, primarily key functioning billets such as the UMCC clerk to conduct physical labor and simple tasks that should be facilitated by company oriented working parties. These distractions detract from task completion for the S4.

-Operational Awareness: SNM in the conduct of DTP II displayed visible lack of understanding and comprehension of scheduled movements, pre-coordinated support, and troop to task coordination. This lack of engagement led to the action officer and other subordinates coordinating and executing support in the stead of the Bn Log Chief.

D. TASKS ASSIGNED FOR NEXT PERIOD

For the period of training coordination and preparation of operations ISO BVII, SNM will engage with the training plan and prove core competency in running and supervising the management of the ALOC during BVII. SNM will provide daily debriefs to his immediate supervisor, providing insight and forethought into the daily/weekly/monthly battle rhythm events and training coordination in an effort to cover all required classes and functions of support. During the following reporting period, SNM will make an effort to compose himself in the work space, no matter the context. Leading Marines by example and creating a stable environment. Task acceptance and task completion will be at the forefront of SNM's actions.

E. MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS / ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

SNM needs to cultivate command and control ability, leadership presence, and refine his processes to sustain and improve his performance in the next period.

F. CERTIFICATION

Signature of Marine Counseled	Do you wish to make a statement?		
	YES	NO	
Signature of Marine Performing Counseling	Date:	Proficiency	Conduct
		N/A	N/A

Crandall Capt Alexander J

From: (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2021 1:43 PM
To: (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
Subject: Statement
Signed By: (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

Here's my characterization of both parties:

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) Incredibly intelligent, blunt, little tolerance for wasting time. My interactions with (b) (3) (B) centered mostly around our work relationship, as I was a new (b) (3) (B) in the battalion and he served as the S-3A with a solid understanding of how the unit functioned. I could tell from the start he did not "sugar coat" anything and got straight to the point with peers, subordinates, and was not afraid to dissent with seniors. Throughout my time working with him (approximately 5 months), I never saw him get emotional over a problem, but he did not worry about hurting feelings when he addressed a shortcoming. I don't remember any specific interactions between (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (B), but based on (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) overall proficiency level and character, it does not surprise me to hear they had a verbal altercation at ITX. I am not aware of the exact accusations in this case, but if it centers around (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) singling (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) out, it was likely in response to continued sub-par performance by (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) in a high-stress environment. In my experience with him, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) is mission focused and is not out to discriminate against anyone outside of not meeting standards to accomplish the mission.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) – Friendly, a good guy, unreliable. My interactions with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) were limited to working around him at PTA for BVII last year, and a very short time at ITX (I was TAD during the first half of ITX and showed up right around the time he was fired). I remember him forgetting to coordinate logistics requests that I submitted at PTA. My chief, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) (then (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)) warned me about not relying on him early on in my tenure with 3/3. I spoke with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) (his previous OIC) about his shortcomings during ITX, so it was relatively unsurprising when he got fired.

V/r,
(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
Intelligence Officer
3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment
Camp Hansen, Okinawa Japan
NIPR: (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
SIPR: (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
Cell: (386) 804-0965 (iMessage and Signal)
Office DSN: (315) 623-1240

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)

20210506



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3D MARINE DIVISION
UNIT 35801
FPO AP 96602 5801

5354
EOA

Subj: COMPLAINANT'S NOTICE OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Ref: (a) MCO 5354.1E

1. GENERAL

The Marine Corps continues to take deliberate actions necessary to eradicate prohibited activities and conduct from our ranks. Addressing the problem starts with ensuring that the Marine Corps does not tolerate harassment (to include sexual harassment), unlawful discrimination, or abuse (specifically, hazing; bullying; ostracism; retaliation); wrongful distribution or broadcasting of intimate images; and, certain dissident and protest activity (to include supremacist activity). These behaviors will be referred to collectively as prohibited activities and conduct.

a. I understand that, when communicating with Marine Corps Equal Opportunity (MEO) personnel, they DO NOT have privilege or confidentiality. However, all information I provide is considered protected communication and is therefore "For Official Use Only". That my privacy, and the privacy of other individuals involved, will be protected as much as possible. This means any report of suspected wrongdoing or criminal activity must be reported to the appropriate authorities. Furthermore, information regarding this case may be disclosed to my chain-of-command or others who have an official need for this information in executing their official duties (e.g., SJA, IG, or those conducting investigations).

b. I also understand that if my concern falls outside the purview of this process, the EOA/MEO Office will ensure referral via a "positive hand-off" of this issue to the appropriate office via my chain of command for redress.

2. CLAIMS INVOLVING PHYSICAL CONTACT

I understand that complaints involving physical contact require additional safeguards in order to preserve my rights as the victim. If my complaint involves allegations of hazing, bullying, or sexual harassment that involve physical contact I will be referred to the installation Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) for screening. This is done to preserve my right to file a restricted report. If it is determined that my issue is not related to sexual assault, I will be referred back to this office for further processing of my complaint.

3. COMPLAINANT'S RIGHTS

I understand that I have the following rights:

a. To present any legitimate complaint without fear of intimidation, reprisal, retaliation, or harassment. The issues discussed with the MEO Office, and the matter giving rise to a complaint of prohibited activities and conduct, must be sufficiently precise to describe the action(s) or practice(s) that form the basis of the complaint.

b. To be counseled on the complaint process.

Subj: COMPLAINANT'S NOTICE OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

- c. All official contact with the MEO office is considered protected communications.
- d. To receive military legal assistance, as appropriate, in submitting my complaint. I also have the right to contact the servicing Legal Services Support Section (LSSS) for assistance.
- e. To receive support services throughout the complaint process. Victim services are available to complainants throughout the complaint process. I can request to be referred to support services at any time. I understand that I must notify the MEO representative, or EOA if I want to request such referral from them.
- f. To decline to participate in the investigation process at any time. I may voluntarily and unconditionally withdraw my complaint at any time during the process. However, the commander may continue to take action on this claim.
- g. To be informed of the outcome of my complaint. At the conclusion of the process, I will be notified, in writing, of the decision made with respect to my report by my commanding officer or their designee.
- h. To appeal the commander's disposition of the complaint in writing within five duty days of receipt of notification of the final decision on the filed complaint of prohibited activities and conduct.

4. COMPLAINANT'S RESPONSIBILITIES

- a. To advise the command within 60 calendar days of the alleged incident.
- b. To fully participate in the investigation process into complaints alleging prohibited activities and conduct, to the extent required by law.
- c. To submit only legitimate complaints and to exercise caution against frivolous or false allegations.

5. CERTIFICATION

I have no questions regarding my rights and responsibilities at this time. If I do have a question or concern, I understand that I can contact the EOA/MEO office.

(b) (3) (B), (b) (6) 0431
Rank Name (Print First/Middle Int/Last) (EDIPI/MOS)
(b) (3) (B), (b) (6)
Sign _____ Date 20210322

During the time from June to November 2020 I was the recipient of intimidation from (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). At the time of these events I was the V33 Logistics Chief (S4C) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was the Assistant Operations Officer (S3A).

The first negative encounter I had with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was during training at Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA) on the big island of Hawaii. During a training event at PTA, the Logistics Officer (S4) and Assistant Logistics Officer (S4A) departed the Administrative & Logistics Operations Center (ALOC) to set up a forward COC leaving me in charge of the ALOC in their absence. It was during this time (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) would constantly question every decision that I made and make me provide logistics reports 3 times a day. In some cases belittling me in front of my Marines. One particular instance where I was belittled in front of my Marines was regarding an ammunition drop at a range for India Company. India radioed into COC that they had not received the ammo. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) became enraged and yelled at me to fix the problem. I contacted the Ammunition Chief to get more information where I was informed the ammo had been already dropped off and signed for by (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) from India Co. I was able then to put together that India was expecting the ammo to be dropped off at the bivouac and not the range they would be firing on. I informed (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) of my discovery where I received additional scolding for my methods in obtaining this information. During PTA, I assumed this was the (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) way of attempting to improve my decision making skills and took it as nothing more. After PTA and out of the field, I made a conscious effort to avoid (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and had minimal interactions with him. It would not be until Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) 1 21 where I would have a negative encounter with him.

During ITX 1-21 in September through November 2020, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) intimidation would increase significantly to not only myself, but other Marines in the S4. During one particular instance, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) criticized and tasked me and S4A (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) in the presence of our OIC (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)). (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) seemed amazed that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was tasking us without any input from our OIC and question (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) on the legitimacy of this tasking. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) response is as quote: "He is the S3A and has tasking authority". It is worth noting at this time that the S4 had significant logistics shortfalls during this time and it is possible that the officer side of the house was aware of (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) pending relief for cause. It was also during this time the H&S Company Commander (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) also became a voice in tasking the S4 section, myself included, albeit with different means of doing so.

On October 15, 2020 during ITX 1-21, I would have my final and most intense encounter with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). At 1120, I enter the COC and notice a brief occurring for an event. I take my seat at the ALOC and notice (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) staring at me from his computer with his headphones on at his desk in COC. The Motor Transport Chief (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)) walks into the COC and signals me to follow. I then follow (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) to the side opposite from brief where he signals the Communication Chief (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)). We then start a very low audible discussion on communications capabilities in vehicles and the commander's intent. It is at this time (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) takes off his headphones to get up and confront me. He pulls me aside and asks me why I am in the COC. When I try to respond, he tells me that I am notoriously "too loud" and that I should leave the COC because I don't belong here. It was at this point I no longer felt that the (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was trying to improve me, I felt targeted. Later that afternoon, I began a conference call with the 3d Regiment Mobility Officer (b) (3) (B), (b) (6)) which included myself and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). During this call I was inquiring the feasibility of storing sniper rifles in the baggage compartment of the commercial plane retrograding back to Hawaii when (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) overheard and decided to listen in. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) stood over me with his army crossed while I conversed with the Mobility Officer. She asked my how my sniper rifles I wanted to load and I responded

that I would have to get back to her with that information. It was at this time (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) proceeded to yell at me, "Answer the fucking question", and insult me on my worthlessness. While still on the phone, I get up and take the conversation out of the COC. As I am leaving COC I could hear (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) yelling, "Don't come back. You don't belong in here". (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) questioned the engagement that had just took place, however, I was unwilling at the time to elaborate due to the mental state I was in. After finishing the conversation, I return to the COC to obtain my bag and weapon. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) then continues his yelling and insults. He gets out of his seat to block my path. When I made an attempt to go around him he pushed me. It was at this time (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) steps in to separate us. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) then instructs me to obtain my possessions and weapon to go cool off. The Marines that witnessed this event transpire include all of the Corporal and below in S1, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6), and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). Marines who had the best vantage point of the event are (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) (S1), (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) (S1) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) (S4). There were also S2 Enlisted personnel, however, I am uncertain on their vantage point due to where they were located at. (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was not present during this time. I was banned from the COC by (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) for a full 24 hours until (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) returned and allowed me back in. Approximately 72 hours after this event I was relieved and sent back to Hawaii to work at Regiment. It is worth noting that sometime after my relief both (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) and (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) were relieved as well. I don't believe this event had any relation to my relief or the relief of either (b) (3) (B), (b) (6).

Upon checking in to 3d Marine Regiment in November 2020, I was appointed as the Facilities Chief. In February 2021, I was moved from S4 to Headquarters and appointed as SACO. This is when I learned that (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) was now the Executive Officer for 3d Marine Regiment, H&S Company. In the month of March, (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) placed me on AROOD three times, twice in the same week. While this may only be a coincidence, I question events like this due to my history with (b) (3) (B), (b) (6). I currently make a conscious effort to avoid (b) (3) (B), (b) (6) in my daily duties and speak to him only when it is absolutely necessary.